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In the quest for diagnostic certainty we should welcome any-
thing that improves our ability to interpret diagnostic tests. In
this issue of the International Journal of Epidemiology Joël Coste
and Jacques Pouchot1 describe a method for constructing a
three-zone division for continuously measured diagnostic test
results. The concept of three-zone diagnostic decision making,
coined by Feinstein in 1990,2 strengthens the explanatory
power of our customary ‘yes–no’ reasoning by including a grey
zone of intermediate values in which a disease cannot be said to
be present or absent. Coste and Pouchot illustrate their proposal
with examples of tuberculin testing and markers of anaemia in
children. They use empirical data from the literature to analyse
the distribution of test results in diseased and non-diseased
populations and define upper and lower limits of a grey zone
beyond which the post-test probabilities would allow the target
disease to be safely ruled in or out. This method makes assump-
tions about the pre-test probability and the estimated size of the
likelihood ratios needed to achieve the required post-test
probabilities.
It is tempting to replace the ‘black–white division’ of con-
tinuous test results, where black is diseased and white non-
diseased, and include a grey zone. Coste and Pouchot’s method
implicitly uses the principle of decision thresholds3 to estimate
the bounds of the grey zone. The ‘treatment-test threshold’
denotes the probability of a disease when treating (or invasive
testing) and further testing are of equal value and equates to 
a test result around the grey–black limit. The ‘no treatment-test
threshold’ defines the disease probability at which one would
neither treat nor conduct further tests and includes test results
around the grey–white limit. The calculation of such limits is
complex and depends on elements of the disease, on values of
the society, the doctor, and the patient. The difficulties encoun-
tered when applying this concept to decision making in
individual patients should not be underestimated, and is not
adequately addressed by Coste and Pouchot.
According to Bayes’ theorem a test is a transformer of pre-test
probability.4 Test results are only interpretable if this probability
can be estimated, however roughly. The definition of any par-
tition—be it two zone or three zone—has to consider the pre-
test probabilities, which usually vary considerably within
different settings or even in between single patients. In exercise
electrocardiograms (ECG), for example, pre-test-probabilities
for coronary artery disease in a young woman and an elderly
man with chest pain may differ 50-fold—and so will the post-
test probability of an identical test result.5
The distribution of disease stages and co-morbidity within a
population influences test performance. Thresholds are applic-
able only to populations similar to the one in which they have
been ‘calibrated’.6 The example of tuberculin skin testing used
by Coste and Pouchot themselves illustrates this problem. Can
the properties of this test be applied to people with human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) if it has been calibrated on a
population without impaired immune systems? It is therefore
important to calibrate test parameters in comparable settings to
minimize the problem of different distributions of disease stages
and co-morbidities.7 Furthermore, a single test can often be
used in the diagnosis of different diseases so the usefulness and
width of the grey zone varies according to the condition the test
is used for.
In practice clinicians hardly ever interpret results of con-
tinuous tests as being only ‘normal’ or ‘pathological’. They always
take into consideration ‘how positive’ or ‘how negative’ the
result is. Will the suggested grey zone improve diagnosis or may
it even mislead less-experienced clinicians into a false diagnostic
security? By defining grey zones that take into account the
reservations made above the limits may be unacceptably
widened. In the two examples used by the authors one-third or
even more of the possible test results could come to lie in the grey
zone. This jeopardizes the explanatory power of this concept.
In spite of all these drawbacks we think that the proposal to
enrich the interpretation of test results by measuring contin-
uous parameters in shades of grey is an important step in the
right direction. In their graphs Coste and Pouchot illustrate the
role of likelihood ratios in defining multiple threshold-
calibrations. They show how likelihood ratios allow for the
estimation of a test result to enhance or reduce pre-test
probabilities. Why not limit ourselves to defining likelihood
ratios—measures not influenced by pre-test probability—for
different partitions of test results? For example, it may be help-
ful to know how much the pre-test probability of coronary
artery disease is modified by different degrees of ST-segment
depression in stress ECG testing.
Likelihood ratios for different thresholds do not solve all the
problems mentioned so far but they allow for a more easily
interpretable differentiation of the black–white concept. We
agree with Coste and Pouchot that the presentation of quanti-
tative test results in ‘black and white’ categories is unnecessarily
restricting. The introduction of different shades of grey may
help to improve the interpretation of diagnostic test results and,
more importantly, improve clinical outcomes.
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